This Article examines the debates of the Founders over the separation of powers doctrine as it relates to the executive branch. After surveying the experience in the colonies and under the post-Revolutionary state constitutions, it analyzes the relevant issues at the Constitutional Convention. Rather than focusing on abstract discussions of political theory, the article examines specific decisions and controversies in which separation of powers was a concern. The Article offers a detailed recounting of those debates.
I. INTRODUCTION
On July 17, 1787, the Constitutional Convention continued its discussion on how long the Executive should serve in office.
1 At this point in the proceedings, the deputies had voted to make the Executive eligible for re-election, and the question was whether his term of office should be seven years. Dr. James McClurg (Va.) offered the perhaps surprising motion that the President should serve "during good behavior," that is, potentially for life. 2 Perhaps even more surprising is the vote on his motion. Although six state delegations voted against it, four deputies truly favored a lifetime term and may not have supported the concept in the end.
14 According to Madison, a number of the affirmative voted "probably had it chiefly in view to alarm those attached to a dependence of the Executive on the Legislature, and thereby facilitate some final arrangement of a contrary tendency." 15 Underlying this debate was a concern over separation of powers. As Madison noted, "
[a]n independence of the three great departments of each other, as far as possible, and the responsibility of all to the will of the community seemed to be generally admitted as the true basis of a well constructed government." 16 With respect to the relevance of the separation of powers doctrine to this debate, Madison pointed to a particular reason for endorsing a sufficiently long term of office for the Executive. He thought it necessary to insure a strong counterweight to the Legislature and thus secure a stable government: "Experience had proved a tendency to throw all power into the Legislative vortex. . . . If no effectual check be devised for restraining the instability and encroachments of the latter, a revolution of some kind or other would be inevitable." 17 The debate over Dr. McClurg's motion, then, was a debate between those believing that the Executive should be little more than an secretary to the Legislature and those believing it should be a separate, vital branch of the government. Given the debate's background of the unaccustomed to exert them in public debate." Madison's support "was meant to aid in parrying the animadversions likely to fall on the motion of Dr. McClurg." Id. at 311 n †.
14. See id. at 313 n*.
Id.
16. Id.
Id. at 312. Madison uses the same metaphor in
The Federalist to argue the need for checks and balances: "The legislative department [in the states] is every where extending the sphere of its activity, and drawing American experience with monarchs, weak or unaccountable executives, and powerful state legislatures, it is easy to understand why establishing a strong national Executive proved to be such a struggle.
This debate suggested no ill reflection on George Washington, presumably the first President. However, it did indicate apprehension about the more distant future. Benjamin 18. MADISON'S NOTES, supra note 1, at 65-66.
19. In should be no surprise that the proponents of the Constitution were obliged to defend the document against arguments that it would foster corruption. In The Federalist, the theme of corruption arises nine times. See THE FEDERALIST, supra note 17, at 141-41 (NO. 22 (Hamilton) discussing the threat of corruption by foreign nations); at 376-77 (NO. 55 (Madison) arguing that a small House of Representatives of 65 delegates would not be susceptible to corruption); at 377 (NO. 55 (Madison) arguing that constitutional checks and the positive aspects of human nature limit the possibility of the President and the Senate making appointments to government positions in a corrupt manner); at 418 (NO. 62 (Madison) arguing that the need for the two houses in the legislature to act concurrently serves as a check on corrupt legislative conduct); at 437-38 (NO. 64 (Jay) arguing that the need for the President and two-thirds of the Senate to concur in the making of a treaty serves to prevent the making of treaties for corrupt purposes); at 459-60 (NO. 68 (Hamilton) arguing that the procedure for electing the President involves so many individuals that it makes corruption of the process extremely difficult and thus highly unlikely); at 505-06 (NO. 75 (Hamilton) arguing that requiring the concurrence of both the President and the Senate to make treaties serves as a check on corruption); at 514 (No. 76 (Hamilton) arguing that the ability of a President to corrupt the Senate is impracticable because he would have to corrupt so large a number of Senators and because the Constitution provides checks on executive influence over the Senate); at 563 (NO. 83 (Hamilton) arguing that trial by jury serves as a check on corruption more in criminal cases than in civil cases). See THORNTON ANDERSON, CREATING THE CONSTITUTION: THE CONVENTION OF 1787 AND THE FIRST CONGRESS 166-72 (1993) (arguing that the anti-democratic biases in the Constitution stem in part from an effort to avoid corruption arising from the force of popular opinion).
20. See M.J.C. VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 175-76 (2d ed. 1998). The English theory of mixed government held that the presence in the legislature of the three the perceived primary purpose of the doctrine was to separate a state's governmental branches in order to curb the executive power so that it could not corrupt the legislative and judicial branches. 21 In the ensuing years, the founding generation recognized the importance of employing the doctrine to limit the powers of the legislative and judicial branches as well as the executive branch. 26. THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, supra note 17, at 334. Madison also noted two additional sources of a legislature's power: (1) extensive constitutional powers that lack precise limits and thus permit encroachment on the other branches, and (2) its access to "the pockets of the people," and thus influence over the pecuniary rewards of those who serve in the other branches, which may create a dependence of those individuals on the legislature. See id. See also VILE, supra note 20, at 155-60 (describing the extensive power of state legislatures in the postRevolutionary period and the concerns that it raised). 
A. Colonial Governors
The reputation of America's colonial governors did not further the argument for a strong national executive. At the Constitutional Convention, Benjamin Franklin noted the corrupt conduct of Pennsylvania's colonial governor:
The negative of the Governor was constantly made use of to extort money. No good law whatever could be passed without a private bargain with him. . . . When the Indians were scalping the western people, and notice of it arrived, the concurrence of the Governor in the means of self-defence could not be got, till it was agreed that his Estate should be exempted from taxation: so that the people were to fight for the security of his property, whilst he was to bear no share of the burden.
39
Corruption flowed from the nature of British politics in the eighteenth century. The political structure was based on the power of the monarch--and the colonial governor-to bestow patronage and emoluments. As Gordon Wood has noted, the Americans "knew only too well how society was organized by intricate and personal ties to men of power."
40
The power of the governors over the colonial legislatures also raised the ire of Americans. A governor might dismiss officers from the militia if their votes in the legislature displeased him. 41 If a legislature was compliant, a governor might decline to call a new election.
On the other hand, he might choose to rule on his own and neglect to call the body into session.
42
Antipathy toward the colonial governors, however, resulted from more than the issue of corruption. In the royal colonies, the governor had ruled with the advice of a governor's council, which consisted of the upper house of the legislature and which had a membership drawn from the colonial gentry, that is, the aristocratic class of society. This collaboration suggested a "mixed government" model far removed from a "separation of powers model" bottomed on a democratic base, which was gaining popularity in America. 43 As one historian described the political situation:
The Governor was not, of course, a true "executive officer." He did execute the decisions of the colonial legislature but his power was much greater than this. He the Stuart kings had been to the Commons." 45 James Wilson (Pa) recognized that the difficulty lay in the accountability of the governors to a foreign source. "{T}hey were regulated by foreign maxims: they were directed to a foreign purpose. Need we be surprised, that they were objects of aversion and distrust? Need we be surprised, that every occasion was seized for lessening their influence, and weakening their energy?" 46 Initially, the colonists decried the extensive gubernatorial power as symptomatic of an imbalanced constitution. Over time, however, they articulated their discontent as a concern with a lack of a proper separation of powers. 47 Thus, the idea of a mixed and balanced government gave way to a democratic version of separation of powers that eschewed monarchical and aristocratic power. 48 Separation of powers was not a new idea; one historian has described it as a "relatively minor eighteenth century maxim. 56. See MA. CONST. of 1780, A DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, art. XXX. After considerable delays brought on by a conflict over who should draft the state constitution, the state house of representatives and the council a body of 28, which sat as the upper house, the executive and the supreme judicial tribunal sat as a convention and proposed a constitution, which the voters rejected. See VILE, supra note 20, at 164-65. Between 1779 and 1780, a constitutional convention, beset with delays, drafted a new constitution, which town meetings considered, article by individual article. When the majority of a town's voters rejected an article, the town meeting often proposed an alternative. In 1780, faced with a confusing set of responses from the towns, the convention declared that the constitution had received the approval of two-thirds of the voters. See ADAMS, supra note 12, at 86-93.
Hampshire 57 , and Georgia. 58 Perhaps Virginia's constitution offered the most complete statement of the doctrine in its strictest form:
The legislative, executive, and judiciary department, shall be separate and distinct, so that neither exercise the powers properly belonging to the other: nor shall any person exercise the powers of more than one of them, at the same time; except that the Justices of the County Courts shall be eligible to either House of Assembly.
59
In accepting the doctrine, the former colonists claimed that they rejected the structure of most previous colonial governments. However, the new structures did not necessarily reflect that doctrine. For example, the colonists had seen the extensive power of the governors as resulting in an imbalanced constitution. In the new state constitutions, the governorships were far from separate independent branches of government. According to some historians, the primary result of the separation of powers doctrine was to bar the same individual from serving in both the executive and legislative branches but allowing many intrusions by the legislative branch on the other branches. 64 On the other hand, the doctrine also separated the executive from the lawmaking function of the legislative branch.
65
During the next few years, however, the executive branch gained comparatively more independence in the later constitutions of New York, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire. 66 The words of these constitutions suggest a sophisticated understanding of the practical limits on implementing a separation of powers doctrine.
The New Hampshire Constitution recognized that a strict separation of powers might not be possible or in the best interests of a free government:
In the government of this state, the three essential powers thereof, to wit, the legislative, executive, and judicial, ought to be kept as separate from and independent of each other, as the nature of a free government will admit, or as is consistent with that chain of connection that binds the whole fabric of the constitution in one indissoluble bond of union and amity. 67 The New York Constitution awarded the governor considerable power. The citizenry elected the governor. The governor could veto legislation, but only as part of a revisionary council that also included the state supreme court judges and the chancellor. A two-thirds majority of both houses was required to overrule the veto. Although the lower house of the legislature could initiate impeachment proceedings, conviction could come only from a special council consisting of senators, the chancellor, and state supreme court judges. 68 The New York Constitution also gave the governor a role in making political appointments by including him in The New York Constitution initially provided that the governor would have "a casting voice, but no other vote . . . ." The amendment clarified this ambiguous wording to provide that the vote was "vested concurrently" in the governor and council members.
other branches.
70
The Massachusetts Constitution also gave the governor considerable power. A popular vote served as the method for selecting the governor. 71 Although the state constitution also established an executive council, the governor was authorized to call together its members at his discretion and employ it in an advisory capacity. 72 The governor also enjoyed the check of a legislative veto power, subject to an override by two-thirds of both houses of the legislature.
73
New Hampshire's 1784 constitution followed the Massachusetts scheme, although it did not grant its executive a legislative veto.
74
Although the state constitutions suggest some common themes, particularly in their delegation of most authority to the legislature and their reliance on the separation of powers doctrine, they also suggest a lack of consensus on other issues. or minimize corrupt conduct also underlay this dialogue.
77
Because of this diverse background, the deputies to the Constitutional Convention were of differing minds on these issues. In addition, although the deputies had previous experience on the state level, they now were dealing with these issues on the national level where their deliberations had to consider the demands of this new political context. These issues were intertwined; in sorting them out, views of the deputies on separation of powers had decisive influence on the process of defining the Executive.
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION AND THE EXECUTIVE
The deputies to the Convention focused on the separation of powers doctrine with respect to seven issues concerning the executive branch: choosing the Executive, permitting the 
A. Choosing the Executive
Determining the method for selecting the Executive proved to be one of the Convention's most difficult tasks. It did not fully resolve the issue until the very end of the three and one-half month session.
79 Proposed methods included election by the national legislature, popular vote, state legislatures, state executives, and popularly chosen electors. 80 One concern was how to insure that the Executive would not become dependent on whoever selected him. Yet, Roger Sherman (Ct.), at this point fearful of a strong executive, declared that he favored election by the national legislature, making the executive "absolutely dependent" on the national legislature "as it was the will of that which was to be executed. The proposal failed to garner unanimous approval. Alexander Hamilton (N.Y.) disapproved of the "mutual connection and influence" that the proposal would create between the two branches. 94 Charles Pinckney (S.C.) feared the mode of election would make the Executive "the mere creature" of the Senate. 95 James Wilson argued that the proposal had a "dangerous tendency toward aristocracy" in that it gave too much power to the Senate: 96 "They will have in fact, the appointment of the President, and through his dependence on them, the virtual appointment to offices; among others the offices of the Judiciary Department. They are to make Treaties; and they are to try all impeachments."
97
In response to these concerns and with little debate, the Convention later shifted the responsibility to the House, the less aristocratic body and the body having fewer entanglements with the Executive.
98
These deliberations illustrate how strongly the separation of powers doctrine influenced the method of selecting the Executive and led to a method closely related to popular election. To avoid executive dependency on the legislative branch, the deputies explored a variety of alternative methods and ultimately settled on an electoral system. The chosen system permitted considerable reliance on the democratic voice. In addition, by reducing the disproportionate voting power that the heavily populated states enjoyed, the use of electors prevented those states from completely controlling the outcome. Without the concern over separation of powers, it is doubtful that the deputies would have turned to a system that would so reflect popular sentiment. Instead, they likely would have delegated the power of appointment to the Senate or House.
When the deputies faced the problem of breaking ties and resolving close election contests, situations some expected to occur regularly, 99 they were willing to violate the strict version of the separations of powers doctrine by assigning that responsibility first to the Senate and later to the House. Shifting the forum to the House also reflected in part a concern over separation of powers. In addition to being the more democratic legislative branch, the House was also comparatively less entwined with the Executive.
B. Permitting the Executive to Seek a Second Term
Closely connected with the issue of appointing the Executive was the issue whether an Executive, 107 it argued that the change obviated the need to prohibit reelection. 108 Once the Convention adopted the proposal, objections to reelection quickly died out. The concern over reelection, then, was tied to the separation of powers concern that permitting the legislative branch to select the Executive would compromise the independence of the individual that it appointed.
C. Removing the Executive
The Convention debated how to deal with an Executive who was performing his duties in a highly inappropriate manner. Some deputies rejected the notion of removing an Executive and advocated relying on his leaving office at the end of his term. With respect to authorizing impeachment, the major contrary argument was that a removal process would violate the separation of powers doctrine and thus make the Executive too dependent on the Legislature. Yet, even during a time when selection of the Executive lay within the province of the Legislature, the deputies were willing to set aside the objection in order to establish a mechanism for removing an Executive who engaged in misconduct. The deputies thus showed that they were willing to modify a strict separation of powers by adding a check by one branch on another. Moreover, by making the procedure for removal cumbersome, they gave the Executive-and the Judiciary-more independence than they otherwise might have enjoyed. 
Id.
124. See BRUFF, supra note 1, at 311 (making this point).
D. Devising the Executive Veto
The Virginia Plan, the set of proposals that the Convention first considered, provided that a Council of Revision should have veto power over the national legislature with the Council consisting of "the Executive and a convenient number of the National Judiciary." 125 The proposal perhaps offered a compromise with the precedent of the state constitutions that did not authorize an executive veto. 126 However, the proposal failed and gave way to a veto exercised by the Executive alone, but with the option of a legislative override.
127
With the defeat of the proposal for a revisionary council, James Wilson (Pa.) and James
Madison immediately moved for an alternative in which the Executive and some members of the federal judiciary would exercise a joint legislative veto. 128 On three occasions, Wilson and
Madison unsuccessfully moved for a veto exercised by both these branches.
129
As might be expected, the proposal met with the objection that it would defeat the doctrine of separation of powers. Elbridge Gerry (Ma.) argued that the proposal would bind together the Executive and Judiciary "in an offensive and defensive alliance against the Legislature, and render the latter unwilling to enter into a contest with them. proposal as "an auxiliary precaution in favor of the maxim;" it added a "defensive power" to each branch that would secure the branch's independence. 136 Madison pointed to the British constitutional practices of admitting judges to the House of Lords and executive councils where they could review certain laws and of permitting the King to veto legislation. 137 He further noted that if joining the Executive and Judicial into a revisionary body was an improper mixture of powers, then so was granting a veto to the Executive alone.
138
Wilson also denied any violation of the separation of powers doctrine. "The separation of the departments does not require that they should have separate objects but that they should act separately though on the same objects."
139
After the final defeat of the proposal by Madison and Wilson, the Convention expressed its concern over the lack of a sufficient check on the Legislature by voting to change the legislative override of a veto so that an override would require a three-fourths vote by each House, as opposed to a two-thirds vote. 140 In the final days of the Convention, however, it reversed itself and reverted to requiring only a two-thirds vote out a fear that a three-fourths override put too much power in the hands of the Executive. 
144.
The power in question has a further use. It not only serves as a shield to the executive, but it furnishes an additional security against the enaction of improper laws. It establishes a salutary check upon the legislative body calculated to guard the community against the effects of faction, precipitancy, or of any impulse unfriendly to the public good, which may happen to influence a majority of that body. Id. at 495. debate over whether the legislative override should require a two-thirds or three-fourths vote demonstrates the concern over granting the Executive too much power.
E. Requiring Legislative Advice and Consent on Executive Appointments
In developing a provision governing executive appointments, the deputies followed an increasingly complex course and arrived at a sophisticated resolution. The Virginia Plan, the first proposal that the Convention considered, made no mention of who should appoint the various national officers. Early in the deliberations, however, James Madison successfully moved that the Executive should have the power "to appoint to offices in cases not otherwise provided for . . In the end, the deputies had moved from giving the Executive unfettered discretion, to dividing authority over appointments between the Executive and Senate, to increasing the Executive appointment power, but with a Senatorial check on the major appointments. From a separation of powers perspective, the deputies moved from a strict separation of powers to a system of checks and balances. In return for greater breadth of authority, to the dismay of some deputies, the Executive lost a degree of autonomy. Nonetheless, the Executive had gained considerable power. As one authority on separation of powers has argued, authorizing the Executive to make appointments to the judiciary and to positions central to foreign policy, "was a critical step toward a unified executive that could implement its own vision of foreign policy, and that could leave an enduring mark on the federal judiciary." 
IV. CONCLUSION
The separation of powers doctrine played a significant role in shaping the Executive.
Concern over violating the doctrine led to an electoral system that bottomed the branch on the people and threw close elections to the House, the more democratic legislative body. These results, in turn, opened the door to the possibility of reelection.
Concern over separation of powers, however, proved insufficiently compelling to deprive
Congress of the power to remove an Executive for serious misconduct. On this matter, the need to check one branch with another prevailed.
The notion of checks and balances also played a significant role in constructing the executive veto. Without the legislative override, the executive veto doubtless would have proven unacceptable. As for executive appointments, concern over excessive executive power led to granting the Senate a concurring role and thus weakened the Executive. Concern over separation of powers, however, failed to prove strong enough to curb the Executive's power to pardon and to create a vice presidency.
During the course of the Convention, the resolution of these issues helped the notion of the Executive grow stronger. Perhaps the most significant contributions to this growth were the decisions to embrace a modified popular election and to permit an executive veto. Given the background of the post revolutionary state constitutions with their weak executives and powerful legislatures, these decisions could not have come easily.
Although these decisions had theoretical foundations, the deputies still acted
